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U.S. Health Policy and Mothers 
of Children with Disabilities
Janet Hunt-McCool
Economics Consultant
 In this chapter, the effects of tying health insurance coverage to
employment are explored as they affect a potentially vulnerable seg-
ment of the U.S. population: mothers whose children suffer from dis-
abilities or physical limitations.  The U.S. insurance cannot be
described by a single set of benefits or a simple set of regulations at the
federal or state level.  This system is largely voluntary and has evolved
privately.  Benefits, costs to workers, and regulation of insurers vary
substantially by the firm-specific policy covering an employee and his/
her family. In many ways, the U.S. health insurance system in which
employers voluntarily bear the costs of health care provision is unique
among developed countries. 
The shortcomings of this system are well known: a large segment
of population has no health insurance; many people risk loss of insur-
ance through job change, retirement, or unemployment; and uncer-
tainty exists about costs, benefits, and continued access to health
insurance.  The risk of adverse selection may preclude small firms from
offering health insurance.  Persons in worse than average health are
more likely to demand insurance than others.  Premiums, in turn, will
rise above the level that would cover the average worker, reflecting the
greater needs of those who elect coverage.  In small firms, a large and
diverse risk pool is not available to offset this potential selection prob-
lem.  Further, because insurance is a per-person expenditure, part-time
workers and low-wage workers may not be offered employment-based
health insurance.
Not only does the voluntary nature of health insurance coverage
have the potential to distort the price of insurance through adverse
selection, but tax preferences further separate the value of insurance
from their resource costs, creating demand pressures on a very expen-
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sive health care system. (See Newhouse [1994] on the relationships
between medical care use and coverage, and between out-of-pocket
costs and use of services.)
More and more U.S. workers and families are losing private insur-
ance coverage as premiums increase.  Medical care inflation has
exceeded the average rate of inflation in most years of the last two
decades.  Employers are therefore reducing coverage or limiting bene-
fits in response to higher health care costs.  They may also be limiting
pension benefits in response to health costs (Hunt-McCool, Hunt, and
Gabel 1998).
Recently, attention has focused upon the indirect consequences of
an insurance system that effectively ties coverage to full-time work.
These consequences include job lock or limits on voluntary job change
from insurance clauses that deny benefits for health conditions that
existed prior to employment.  Incentives for firms to discriminate
against workers in poor health are also created because premiums
reflect the average health experience of workers in a firm.  Premium
costs are not uniform; rather, they vary to the individual firm based on
expected health risks, generosity of benefits, state mandates of covered
benefits, and competition in the insurance market.  (These issues are
found in Woodbury [1983]; Madrian [1994]; Newhouse [1994], among
others.)
In this analysis, I focus on the indirect effects of the U.S. health
care system on the labor market: the case of female labor supply for
mothers of children with disabilities and physical limitations.  Two
institutional constraints create special problems for this group.  First,
premiums per worker are indivisible regardless of the hours one works.
Because workers must repay benefit costs indirectly through their pro-
ductivity, full-time work is often a prerequisite for obtaining work-
related health insurance.  Secondly, because of scale economies, risk
pooling, and the problems of adverse selection, a firm can generally
offer health insurance at a premium substantially lower than the cost of
an individually purchased health plan.  Thus, full-time work is not only
a prerequisite for employer-based coverage, it may also be associated
with a substantial reduction in the premium.
It is also reasonable to assume that substantial demands are made
on the nonmarket time of caregivers if family members suffer from
special health problems.  Therefore, if the individual has both a high
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value of nonmarket time and a high demand for health insurance, a ten-
sion is created between the competing uses of time.  Full-time work is
generally required to obtain health insurance.  It may come at the
expense of time needed for monitoring and caring for a child with spe-
cial needs.
A test of the competing forces on the allocation of time is provided
in this research.  The labor supply of married mothers and single moth-
ers of children with disabilities are contrasted using data from the U.S.
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES).  The health insurance
options facing these mothers include 1) no insurance, 2) Medicaid, a
state/federal program for very low income households, 3) employment-
based insurance, often conditional on full-time work and relatively
high wages, or, 4) if married, possible coverage by the spouse’s
employer-provided insurance policy.  If the mother is not married and
the child is not covered by the policy of the former spouse, then the
extent to which time and paid medical care are substitutes determines
whether these mothers work, how much they work, and the nature of
their insurance coverage, if any.
In addition to the analysis of labor supply, this research employs
data on the specific health conditions of children.  The ICD9 (Interna-
tional Classification of Disease, 9th edition) codes attached to all chil-
dren’s physician visits and hospitalizations were reviewed.  A public
health pediatrician, Dr. Jennifer Mayfield, developed indicators of con-
ditions that were considered sufficiently severe or chronic to require 1)
substantial medical expenses, or 2) the need of additional monitoring
of the child.  Parental responses to a child health survey were also
employed to identify other children with substantial physical limita-
tions or mental disorders. These conditions were then grouped into cat-
egories based on chronicity and disease state.
In this way, the analysis attempts to study two questions regarding
female work effort in the United States: the effects of various public
and private health insurance offerings on labor supply given child
health, and the effect of specific child-health problems on work effort.
The analysis proceeds along the following lines.  In the next sec-
tion I provide background material to illustrate the extent of this poten-
tial problem.  The theory of labor supply under insurance and health
care needs is then developed as an extension of the work of health pro-
duction functions and the allocation of time.
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The third section contains a description of the data and the empiri-
cal test: a multinomial logit model of work choices under alternative
scenarios about insurance coverage.  Previewing this evidence, insur-
ance affects the labor supply of both single and married women in pre-
dictable ways.  The final section concludes the analysis.
THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM
The U.S. health care system is a composite of producers, payers,
and consumers in the private and public sector.  Key features of the sys-
tem are 1) near universal care for the elderly through Medicare, a fed-
eral program, 2) a limited state/federal Medicaid program for some
poor, some poor children, and some elderly in need of long-term care,
3) and an employer-based system of health insurance provision for the
majority of U.S. households that hold insurance.
  Both for-profit and nonprofit providers (persons and institutions)
compete for medical care dollars.  As noted, private insurance coverage
is voluntary, largely at the level of the employer.  Regulations vary by
type of coverage and by state.  A consequence of rising health care
costs has been limitations on insurance offerings by employers to their
employees.  The number of workers covered has declined over time.
The probability of obtaining private coverage has been found to depend
upon age, gender, income, geographic location, health status, marital
status, and the distribution of firms by type and size within a geo-
graphic area.  Nearly 90 percent of private insurance coverage is
employment-based, with just under 60 percent of the U.S. population
receiving coverage in this manner.
Still, three-quarters of persons without health insurance live in
households with working family members.  This is not a problem of
poverty, per se.  Most persons without insurance are in households in
excess of the poverty threshold.  Currently, some 18 percent of the U.S.
population have no insurance coverage, either private or public.  This
number has increased over time with the rising cost of health.  The loss
of coverage has disproportionately occurred among persons outside the
highest wage group.
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Private insurance is often available for persons not covered by
work or a spousal policy, or ineligible for public coverage.  However,
premiums vary a great deal between individuals and groups, making
individual purchases out-of-reach for many.  The asymmetry of infor-
mation between insurers and individuals, or the adverse selection prob-
lem, is often considered to be the source of this differential. 
Medicare is the federal program that covers most elderly and cer-
tain qualified younger disabled persons.  All but one percent of older
persons (65 and above) qualify for Medicare, insuring some basic cov-
erage for 38 million persons in 1996.  Like private insurance, Medicare
beneficiaries generally pay a deductible and a co-payment for most ser-
vices.  Medicare does not cover all services; notably, for prescription
drugs.  Because hospital use and prescription drugs may result in sub-
stantial out-of-pocket costs, many older persons purchase private sup-
plemental coverage as well.
The Medicaid program covers certain eligible groups: the blind,
disabled, aged, pregnant women, and low-income families with chil-
dren.  The income and other criteria for eligibility vary by state once
basic federal criteria are met.  Services coverage is highly variable as
well.  Thus, it is extremely difficult to provide a proper description of
the program.
In 1994, Medicaid covered 40 to 60 percent of the low-income
population in each of the states, totaling 34 million persons.  Spending
by states ranged from around $1,000 per covered person to an average
$4,800 at this time.  Half of this spending was devoted to acute care,
while long term care services accounted for one-third.  The remainder
was spent on hospitals serving a disproportionate share of low income
and Medicaid persons.  Most coverage applies to the poor or near-poor
elderly, and to the very young.  Medicaid is free and without user fees.
Special provisions for children are found in a number of state Medicaid
programs.  For example, Medicaid is virtually the only program that
covers in-home care for children with disabilities.
Historically, eligibility for Medicaid was tied to eligibility for
assistance through either Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) or another means-based program, Supplemental Security
Income.  In recent years, however, Congress expanded Medicaid to
poor children and pregnant women who do not qualify for cash assis-
tance.  Recently, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program
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replaced AFDC, but eligibility for Medicaid remains nearly the same
(Liska 1998).
The result of living in households maintained solely by females is
often poverty.  In the United States, another consequence is being with-
out health insurance coverage.  Indeed, while more women in the
United States are covered by health insurance than men, this is the
result of public coverage and spousal benefits in private policies.  Pri-
vately, fewer women than men are offered health insurance on the job
(Schur and Taylor 1991).  In the United States, one-half of approxi-
mately 75 million families have children.  Twelve million of these fam-
ilies are maintained by women only, while 4 million are maintained by
men.  Policy to limit Medicaid growth by the states and the erosion of
employee coverage suggests that more and more low-income women
with children may lose coverage.
THE ALLOCATION OF TIME
At this time, stylized examples of health production, a nonmarket
use of time, is discussed.  Then, a formal model in which health insur-
ance and full time work are explicitly linked is developed.  The conse-
quences for labor supply of women are developed under this constraint. 
Examples of Insurance Offerings and the Allocation of Time
The basic model of health production (Grossman 1972) is an
extension of the more general model of Becker’s (1965) theory of the
allocation of time.  In the health production model, at least one of the
home-produced goods is the stock of family health.  Its inputs, like any
other home goods, are time of family members and market-purchased
goods—in this case, medical care.  Allowing for substitution between
time and goods (medical care), production isoquants can be developed
that are associated with some indicators of health (e.g., absence of bed
days per year, pain-free days, life years).  Like any other home produc-
tion, the family is constrained by income (earnings and asset income),
time, and the production technology.  These constraints apply to health
production as well as any other home-produced good that generates
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utility for the family.  Thus, health states are traded against other home-
produced goods such as time in recreation, dining, and educating chil-
dren.  Crucially, money income is generated primarily through market
work, so time in home production is purchased by a reduction of work
hours (and therefore money earnings).
Figure 1 contains the production isoquant and budget constraint in
the case where access to health care and labor supply are independent.
This figure may be applicable in the United States for married women
if the husband provides health insurance to the family or if earnings of
the female are too low to qualify for health insurance on the job regard-
less of hours worked.  In these cases, time in health production and
medical care needs do not place undue constraints on labor supply.
In contrast, Figure 2 shows the effects of receiving health insur-
ance on the job, effectively reducing the per-unit price of medical
inputs.  (Firm purchases of group health insurance are cheaper than pri-
vately purchased insurance due to such factors as scale economies, tax
preferences, and bargaining power associated with size.)  In this case,
cheaper health inputs are revealed in a rotation of the budget constraint
upward from T.  However, nonmarket time per week is constrained.  If
the parent works 40 hours per week in order to obtain insurance, the
maximum time remaining is 128 hours per week.  The budget con-
straint is stepped accordingly.
In Figure 3, the budget constraint under Medicaid is shown.  A sub-
stantial penalty for market work occurs in the form of loss of eligibility
for Medicaid (via the underlying limits on the associated program Aid
to Families with Dependent Children).  In the figure, this constraint is
noted as AFDC.  The 100 percent tax on earnings occurs at very low
levels of earnings for many women, given poverty-based eligibility
rules.  (These rules vary by state.  Some states may require work for
AFDC eligibility, and some allow women to maintain child care and
Medicaid for up to two years after leaving the program.  Mostly, rules
are more restrictive and include lifetime and calendar month limita-
tions on eligibility.)
Work, Marriage, and Insurance Coverage: The Evidence
Figure 1 shows the case where purchases of health care and labor
supply are independent.  Health production (H) is dependent upon mar-
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Figure 1 Independence of Hours of Work and the Price of Purchased 
Health Services
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ket purchased health services (M) and time in health production (h). T,
the maximum time in health production, is constrained by the number
of hours in the week, 168 hours.  Therefore, time used in health pro-
duction is taken away from time in the labor market, so if h = 168, then
labor supply must be 0.  The biological/health specific minimum
requirements imply a minimum number of hours in health production
(Zmin) and purchased medical services (Mmin).  Independence of the two
inputs implies only that their relative prices are constant and not depen-
dent upon hours of work, so the budget line is straight.  This budget
allows the household to afford at most H1 amount of health.
Figure 2 shows what happens to the budget constraint if the price
of market-based medical services changes with employer-sponsored
health insurance.  The price of insured health benefits drops vis-à-vis
the private price pushing the budget constraint upward on the M axis.
But to receive insurance (I), full-time work is likely to be required.  In
the figure, this is the point where I = 40, denoting 40 hours of market
work.  Time for important home production activities such as time in
child health is reduced to a maximum of 128 hours.  The budget con-
straint becomes stepped accordingly.
Salkever (1980, 1982a, 1982b), Breslau, Salkever, and Staruch
(1982), and Breslau (1983) have examined how disabled and chroni-





cally ill children affect maternal time allocation.  Salkever found that
children with disabling health conditions affected maternal labor sup-
ply by reducing annual hours of work, but that child health had only a
small impact on the participation decisions.  He defined children’s
health conditions through indicators such as mobility and sensory limi-
tations, mental and nervous system disorders, heart problems, and cir-
culatory or respiratory ailments.  His data included only white, two-
parent families.  The availability of insurance, public or private, was
not explicitly modeled in his analysis, although he did acknowledge
their importance.  Breslau, Salkever, and Staruch reported that having a
disabled child reduced labor supply of married women but had little
effect on single mothers.  Breslau found that if a child in the household
had cystic fibrosis, cerebral palsy, myelodysplasia, or other severe
physical handicaps, the time a married mother spent in housework
increased by more than three hours per week.  No significant effect on
the time in housework by single mothers was found.  A theme common
to these studies is that married women alter hours more so than single
women in response to children’s health problems.
A Formal Model of the Allocation of Time
Our model of parental time allocation in the presence of children
with health problems draws upon the household production framework
of Becker (1965) and Grossman (1972).  The framework is extended to
incorporate the availability of work-related health insurance and the
required trade-off between benefits and wages in a competitive labor
market.  As such, it is a logical extension of Figures 1 and 2, in which
the marginal exchanges of time in health production (Lh) offer market-
purchased health.  Services (M) are affected by health insurance.
Consider the case of one parent and one child with health capital
H0.  Household utility is defined as U(X, H) where X is a good pur-
chased exclusively in the market and H is child health, produced with
inputs of time and medical care.  The child health production function is
(1) H = H[M,Lh | H0, r(e)],
where the productivity of inputs M (market-based medical services)
and Lh (parental time in child health) is contingent on the initial stock
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of health, H0, and the rate of depreciation of health capital, r(e).  The
rate of depreciation is unknown but expected to follow a known proba-
bility distribution defined by e1 or e2.  In good health (state 1), which
occurs with probability p, depreciation is r1, which is low.  In state 2
with probability (1 – p), depreciation is r2, which is high.  Specifically,
we assume that the change in health in state 1 is too low to demand
medical inputs in excess of the amount of the insurance deductible D.
The marginal productivity of M and Lh are presumed greater in the
poor-health state.  Hence there is a state-specific utility created by the
inputs of time, market goods, and medical care.  If the family has
health insurance for the child, the price of medical care, Pm, is not con-
stant.  Instead, out-of-pocket medical care expenditures for the family
are
(2) D + ξ(Pm, M2 – D),
assuming that the poor-health state occurs so that spending on M
exceeds the deductible, D.
Additional out-of-pocket spending beyond D is determined by ξ,
the co-insurance rate, so that the family spends only ξM per unit of M.
However, in the health state r1, spending is not expected to exceed the
deductible and is simply Pm M1.
The household pays for health insurance from the employer indi-
rectly in the form of reduced wages.  This is a requirement of competi-
tive labor markets in which no employer can afford to offer more total
compensation than its rivals.  Firms can, however, vary the distribution
of total compensation between wages and benefits.  If a worker earns
total compensation equal to $S per hour and the worker holds health
insurance, hourly compensation may be written as
(3) S = w + pi I,
where Pi I is the value of insurance purchased per hour of work by an
equivalent reduction in hourly wages.
Labor supply is determined by maximizing expected utility,
(4) max E{U(X,H) = p1(U1,H1)} + 1 – p1(U2,H2),
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subject to a time constraint that divides total weekly hours between
home production and market labor:
(5) T = Lh + Lm,
an hourly compensation constraint expressed in Eq. 3, and the child
health production function described by Eq. 1.
Let G(M, I) describe the family cost of health care.  The cost of
health care is uncertain but has the expected value of the sum of spend-
ing in each state weighted by the state-specific odds:
(6) E{G(M,I | ξ, D, PmM)} = pPmM + (1 – p)[D + ξ(pmM – D)].
Total income of the household is made up of unearned income, V,
and total wage income wLm.  Because purchases of market goods (X)
and spending on medical care cannot exceed total income, the budget
constraint is defined by equating actual spending with actual income in
each state as
(7) X + G(M, I) = V + wLh + V + w(T – Lh),
or simply as
(8) X = V + (S – PiI)(T – Lh) – G(M, I),
where X, I, and G are specific to the state of health that actually occurs.
This problem can be restated as
(9)
The first order conditions are
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They can be transformed into the familiar conditions for optimal insur-
ance: an individual will transfer consumption of X between states of
child health (through the purchase of insurance) in proportion to the
odds of the poor health state occurring.  As p increases, G1 approaches
zero and there are no cost savings from insurance.  Similarly, if p is
low, the benefits from insurance are great.  An individual should be
willing to trade wages (and hence consumption) in state 1 for this ben-
efit.  The equilibrium level of Lh is described in the remaining condi-
tions so that the exchanges between market goods and child health and
medical care and child health are optimal given the probabilities of
each health state.
The first order conditions can be differentiated to develop I, Lh, and
M, defined as functions of exogenous prices, income, and the variables
in the utility and production functions.  Maternal labor supply is
obtained by solving the demand for time in home production.  It too is
state-specific and depends upon the state of health of the child that
occurs.  Maternal labor supply can be expressed as
(10) .
Constraints on Insurance Provision
In reality, time constraints can preclude market work entirely, or
limits on work hours and limited earnings potential may preclude the
offer of health insurance.  A likely constraint facing female households
is that their wages may be too low for the firm to offer any health insur-
ance.  For example, health insurance is unlikely to be offered to part-
time or minimum or low-wage employees who earn too little to offset
the costs of insurance.  For persons affected by these constraints, PI = 0
and w = S, regardless of preferences.
Because full-time employment is usually a requirement for work-
related coverage, the utility of employer-sponsored insurance depends
upon the degree to which parental time in child health can be substi-
tuted for market-provided health care and the extent to which substi-
tutes exist for private health insurance.  Women with very low earnings
are unlikely to be offered job-related health insurance.  An alternative
L T L L w PI P V H r em h m i m o= − = ( , , , , ( ))ξ
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source of coverage is Medicaid for low-income persons.  Eligibility
requirements vary by state but are generally means-tested.
Both the availability of employment-based health insurance and of
Medicaid eligibility are unknown a priori.  Even full-time work may
not guarantee that a worker will obtain employment-related coverage.
Firm attributes including average preferences of workers, size of the
work force, health risks, and the ability to achieve group purchase dis-
counts will affect availability at the firm level.  Similarly, a complex
system of regulations by states and federal government determines
Medicaid eligibility.  Accordingly, the decision to participate in the
labor market is conditioned on the likelihood of obtaining work-related
or public insurance coverage.  Such probabilities are explicitly
included in the estimates of the maternal labor supply decision.
AN EMPIRICAL TEST
Data
To examine the relationships between maternal labor supply and
child health, and between health insurance coverage and labor supply,
we employ data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey
(NMES).  NMES was a year-long survey of the medical care use and
expenditures, and health insurance coverage of the U.S. population
based on about 15,000 households.  A limited number of questions
were also devoted to employment and hours of work.  This analysis
employs a subset of families with children between 1 and 17 years of
age.  These data consist of 3,069 two-parent and 1,590 single-parent
families in which mothers are present.  The sample of married mothers
was further restricted to households in which husbands were employed
full time as wage and salary workers.  
A restriction of the data included the age of children.  Mothers of
children less than one year of age were excluded from the analysis
because of complex institutional rules about parental leave time and
difficulties discerning child illness or limitations at this early stage.
NMES contains two sources of child health information.  First, the
symptom, reason, or condition associated with any reported medical
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event (e.g., physician office visit, hospitalization, use of outpatient
clinic) or disability day was coded into a specific disease category
according to diagnostic classed established by the International Classi-
fication of Diseases, 9th edition.  Secondly, information on parental
responses to the NMES Health Questionnaire for children 4 and under
and for children 5 to 17 was coded for the presence or absence of
health problems.  This information included the general health status of
children, the presence of activity limitations, and the presence of acute
or chronic health problems.  We considered a child to be in need of spe-
cial medical care or monitoring time if she or he had activity limita-
tions, chronic health problems such as asthma, heart murmurs or other
heart problems, or constant, long-lasting digestive problems.
Criteria for defining child health problems included physical dis-
abilities and illnesses of a chronic, persistent, or recurrent nature.
Three decision rules made up the classification scheme: the condition
or diagnosis was potentially costly either in terms of time or medical
care costs; the condition was associated with the risk of unanticipated
child care demands that could interrupt routine schedules such as
schooling or work; and the presence of the condition was likely to be
independent of the time at which it was reported (e.g., the condition
was chronic or recurrent).
The following classes of child health problems were extracted:
LIMITATIONS =  sensory and ambulatory limitations.
INFECT = acute and chronic infectious diseases.
ALLERGY =  allergies and asthma.
PSYCH = drug dependency, emotional problems, depression, and
eating disorders classified as psychological.
TRAUMA = head trauma, fractures affecting mobility, and severe
burns.
METADIG = disorders of the metabolism or digestive tract.
PULMCAR = disorders of the pulmonary and cardiovascular sys-
tems.
Infectious diseases and allergies, common among children, were
included only when they were associated with an unusual event such as
the loss of 10 or more days from school or an episode of hospitaliza-
tion.  They are denoted by
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INF × BED  = infectious  disease resulting in a large number of
bed days.
ALL × STAY = allergy or asthma resulting in one or more hospital
episodes.
Table 1 contains a description of the distribution of children aged
1–17 in the data according to specific health conditions.  Most com-
monly, these children experienced acute or chronic infectious diseases,
allergies or asthma, or recurrent or episodic problems that do not
always connote severity.  Between 2 and 3 percent of children in the
sample had relatively serious health problems of a physically or men-
tally disabling nature, as well as problems that required hospitalization.
Model Specification
Multinomial logit estimates (MLE) of the choice of usual hours of
work per week are used to estimate the effects of child health states and
the availability of private and public insurance on maternal labor sup-
ply.  They are estimated separately for married and single mothers.
The operational definitions of labor supply and health are found in
Table 2.
The choices available include no work, part-time hours (less than
35 hours per week) or work at full-time hours  (the omitted group).
Because multinomial logit incorporates the restrictive IIA assumption,
we tested for IIA using the Hausman-McFadden statistic.  This test
Table 1 Distribution of Health Conditions among Children
Conditions %
Limitations 3.0
Allergy and asthma 13.0
Infectious diseases 15.4
Trauma 2.9
Pulmonary and cardiovascular disorders 3.3
Metabolic and digestive disorders 2.5
Psychological disorders 2.3
Number of children 8,945
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Table 2 Variable Symbols and Definitions
Labor supply
     No work Index denoting that mother does not 
work for pay
     Part-time work Mother works part time
     Full-time work Mother works full time
Health conditions of children
     LIMIT Sensory and ambulatory limitations in 
child
     PULMCAR Pulmonary or cardiac disorder in child
     METADIG Metabolic, digestive, or endocrine 
disorder in child
     PSYCH Psychological or mental disorder
     TRAUMA Head trauma, fracture limiting walking, 
or  serious burns
     INFECT Acute or chronic infectious disease
     ALLERGY Allergy or asthma
Health status of children (events)
     BED10 Child lost 10 or more school days due to 
illness
     HOSP Child was hospitalized at least once
Health conditions (interaction of conditions 
and events)
     ALL × STAY ALLERGY = 1 and one or more hospital 
stays
     INF × BED INFECT = 1 and BED10 = 1
Insurance probabilities (predicted by probit)
     PROB. MEDICAID Odds that mother is eligible for 
Medicaid if not working
     PROB.  INSURANCE Odds that mother would be offered 





Other health insurance 
FATHER INSURED Father holds employment-related health 
insurance
Personal characteristics
     EDUC Years of education
     BLACK Race is black
Income and wealth of household
     NONEARNED INCOME All nontransfer and nonwage income
     FATHER’S WAGE Father’s hourly earnings
involves a comparison between coefficients of a full-choice model
inclusive of all alternatives and the coefficients of the restricted model.
The addition of an alternative should not alter parameter estimates of
the remaining choices if IIA holds.  We did not find compelling evi-
dence of IIA violation (Hausman and McFadden 1984).
The independent variables in the model are the six categories of
health limitations/conditions described previously, and
PROB. INSURANCE = estimated odds of private coverage if
woman with these human capital and experience characteristics
were to work full time.
PROB. MEDICAID = estimated odds of Medicaid coverage if
woman with these human capital and socioeconomic characteris-
tics were not at work.  This is estimated for single mothers only.
Income of husbands in the sample generally precludes Medicaid
coverage.
BLACK = race is black.
EDUCATION = years of education.
CHILDREN 1–2 = presence of children in household aged 2 or
younger.
CHILDREN 3–5 = presence of children in household aged 3
through 5.
BEDUC = interaction term of race and education.
BCHILDREN–2 = interaction term of race and children 2 or under.
BCHILDREN–5 = interaction term of race and children 3 to 5.
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NONEARNED INCOME = all nonwage income except transfer
payments.
This variable is found in the test of married mothers’ labor supply
only.
FATHER’S WAGE = hourly wage of spouse if married only.
BINCOME = interaction between race and income.
BFATHER’S WAGE = interaction between race and father’s wage.
Multinomial Logit Results
Estimates of employment decisions by single and married mothers
are found in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.  The main finding with regard
to disease states is that potentially chronic illnesses in children deter
both single and married mothers from full- or part-time employment.
This result differs from many previous studies that find a response only
among married women.  Women who do work appear to choose lim-
ited hours or part-time work.
In terms of insurance offerings, conflicting labor force incentives
are evident.  Single mothers are responsive to the odds of Medicaid
coverage, while married women are responsive to the odds of obtaining
private health insurance on the job.
The final column in each of the tables shows the distributional
characteristics of each sample.  Married mothers and single mothers
have children with similar disability and disease profiles.  However,
they differ somewhat in the distributions of ages of children and in
race.  Single mothers are more likely to have children between one and
two years old than their married counterparts.  They are also dispropor-
tionately black.  Because the labor market experience of black women
and other women may vary independent from socioeconomic house-
hold characteristics, we calculated interaction terms between race and
children, between race and education, and between race and income in
the sample of married mothers.
The coefficients and marginal probabilities from the logit models
for single mothers are described in Table 3.  Specifically, a child with
activity limitations increases the odds of no work relative to full-time
work by almost 9 percentage points and increases the probability of
part-time versus full-time work by about 4 percentage points.  Children
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LIMIT 0.531 0.087 0.467 0.039 0.063
(0.272) (0.286)
PULCAR 0.485 0.071 0.574 0.058 0.066
(0.260) (0.271)
METADIG 0.065 0.015 –0.021 –0.007 0.042
(0.329) (0.344)
PSYCH 0.128 0.028 –0.010
(0.302) (0.316) –0.009 0.047
ALL × STAY 0.683 0.142 0.102 –0.025 0.026
(0.483) (0.485)
















BLACK 2.076 0.377 1.219 0.613 0.42
(0.781) (0.873)
EDUC –0.194 –0.045 0.048 0.019 11.91
(0.043) (0.0420)
CHILDREN 1–2 1.173 –0.232 0.387 –0.002 0.223
(0.181) (0.213)
CHILDREN 3–5 0.448 0.093 0.069 –0.016 0.324
(0.161) (0.273)




No work vs. 
full-time
work dp/dx Mean
BEDUC –0.149 –0.026 –0.101 –0.006
(0.066) (0.070)
BCHILDREN–2 –0.569 –0.114 –0.167 0.009
(0.253) (0.304)
BCHILDREN–5 0.122 0.023 0.055 0.001
(0.231) (0.273)
LOG L –1,462
NO WORK N1 = 485
PART-TIME N2 = 301
FULL-TIME N3 = 788
a Coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses.
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LIMIT –0.021 0.010 –0.205 –0.039 0.046
(0.239) (0.256)
PULCAR 0.332 0.026 0.532 0.081 0.048
(0.243) (0.242)
METADIG 0.774 0.082 0.950 0.133 0.039
(0.282) (0.281)
PSYCH –0.231 –0.53 0.119 0.039 0.038
(0.275) (0.268)
ALL × STAY –0.037 –0.031 0.341 0.069 0.020
(0.398) (0.363)















BLACK 1.293 0.206 0.587 0.025 0.157
(0.865) (0.859
EDUC –0.024 0.006 –0.147 –0.027 12.49
(0.027) (0.027)
CHILDREN 0–2 0.201 –0.007 0.652 0.114 0.373
(0.099) (0.097)




No work vs. 
full-time
work dp/dx Mean
















BEDUC –0.152 –0.026 –0.035 0.004
(0.075) (0.073)
BCHILDREN–2 0.023 0.032 –0.398 –0.081
(0.264) (0.275)
BCHILDREN–5 0.206 0.088 –0.693 –0.151
(0.264) (0.317)










NO WORK N1 = 649
PART-TIME N2 = 668
FULL-TIME N3 = 1,140
a Standard errors are in parentheses.
with pulmonary or cardiovascular health problems reduce the probabil-
ity of full-time employment relative to working part time by 7 percent-
age points but raise the likelihood of part-time relative to full-time
employment by 6 percent.
As the probability of Medicaid eligibility at zero hours of work
increases, single mothers are more likely to work part time relative to
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full time.  Each percentage point increase in eligibility results in an
increase of no employment by 0.3 percentage points and of part-time
employment by 0.7 percentage points.  Although only marginally sig-
nificant, a one-point increase in the probability of employment-related
health insurance exerts an18-percentage-point decrease in part-time
work relative to full-time employment. 
Education mitigates the reduction in labor supply from full-time to
part-time hours, and its influence is greater for black women than for
other single mothers.  The same is true for young children where the
effects on the interactive influence on part-time work and full-time
work are again mitigated by race. 
Chronic child health problems also affect employment decisions of
married mothers, as shown in Table 4.  The odds of not working
increase by 8.1 percentage points relative to full-time work if children
experience pulmonary or cardiac problems.  For mothers of children
with metabolic digestive disorders, the odds of part-time work over
full-time increase by 8.2 percentage points, with the effects of no work
versus full-time work even stronger at 13.3 percentage points.  Infec-
tious diseases in children leading to inordinate bed days raise the odds
of no work by almost 10 percentage points.
Health insurance on the job matters as well.  Women will opt for
full-time work versus not working if their own chances of being
offered insurance increase.  This effect is on the order of a 50-percent-
age point reduction in the odds of no work.  There are no discernible
effects of insurance on full-time versus part-time work, however.
A working husband with insurance appears to substitute well for
own insurance.  When the husband holds insurance, the mother typi-
cally more often chooses part-time work over full-time work or no
work.  These marginal effects are 0.093 for no work versus full-time
work, but less than 1 percentage point on the choice of part-time versus
full-time employment.
Finally, education is a significant determinant of work; as years of
schooling increase, the odds of either part-time or no work decrease
relative to full-time work.  Education and race interact significantly to
reinforce the work decision in the case of full-time over part-time
work.  Interestingly, race and the presence of older children shows a
significant interaction effect on the decision to work.  Its coefficient in
the model predicting no work versus full-time work is significantly
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negative.  Black mothers of older children tend to work full time more
often than their white counterparts.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The artifact of combining employment and health insurance in the
United States has certain deleterious consequences, especially for
women’s employment.  Madrian (1994) has found job lock, for exam-
ple.  Similarly, Moffitt and Wolfe (1990) found a relationship between
health care needs, employment-based insurance, and Medicaid.
Women would be likely to reduce their Medicaid attachment by 6 per-
cent and increase their workforce attachment by 12 percent if one-third
more jobs offered health insurance.  Wolfe and Hill (1992) simulated
the effects of mandated benefits under different health states and vary-
ing hours of work.  Health insurance created a stronger effect on work
than either child care or wages if either the woman or a dependent child
was in poor health. 
This chapter addressed a related phenomenon—the rigidity in the
work schedule created when essential health benefits are tied to the job.
Data on mothers of children with disabilities were used to test for the
competing effects on time use: the need to work full time to obtain
insurance versus the need for time caring for the child.  The research
considered two new areas of inquiry: the insurance-employment rigidi-
ties of the system and the effects of specific health conditions on single
and married mothers.  Unlike much previous research, we found a link-
age between child disability and time allocation for single women as
well as married women.  With regard to insurance, husband’s coverage,
the odds of own employment-based coverage, and the odds of Medic-
aid coverage all affected labor supply predictably.  Finally, the results
confirmed racial effects on labor, even in the presence of insurance.
These effects interacted with education and number/age of children to
increase black female supply relative to other mothers.  To the extent
black women are either disproportionately low-wage workers or heads
of households in on near poverty, they are subject to the double risks of
the erosion of private health insurance from employers as well as
restrictions imposed by states on Medicaid expenditure growth if they
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are currently eligible.  Even if they maintain health insurance on the
job because they tend to work longer hours than their white counter-
parts, they are in danger of robbing time that would otherwise be
devoted to monitoring and caring for special health needs of their chil-
dren.
There are many reasons why health insurance tied to jobs is ineffi-
cient or inequitable.
The zero-sum alternative of Medicaid, available primarily to low-
income single parents, has its own set of disadvantages.  Lifetime
income and wealth must remain low to maintain health care coverage,
and market skills may depreciate with limits on work.  Women would
appear to suffer worse from the problems created by the employment/
insurance nexus because they routinely provide a large part of the non-
market time to their families.
 Note
My sincere thanks to Alice Nakamura, participants in the W.E. Upjohn/Statistics Canada
Joint Conference on Changes in Working Time in Canada and the United States, and
workshop participants of the Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, Georgetown
University, for helpful comments.  This paper arose from earlier research conducted
jointly with Alan Monheit.  At the time this paper was written, the author was Associate
Professor, Georgetown Institute for Health Care Research and Policy.  Errors, of course,
belong solely to the author.
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